New parliamentary panel report flags China’s increasing footprint in Bangladesh
A sharper warning on shifting regional dynamics
A new report from a parliamentary panel has highlighted China’s growing presence in Bangladesh, warning that the balance of influence in South Asia is shifting more rapidly than many anticipated. The panel’s assessment, focused on economic, infrastructural, and security linkages, underscores how Bangladesh’s rapid development drive has opened wide doors for external partners—with China emerging as one of the most prominent players.
The report’s core message is not apocalyptic. Rather, it emphasizes that China’s presence in Bangladesh is a result of Dhaka’s pragmatic pursuit of infrastructure, energy security, and export-led growth. Still, the analysis outlines a clear implication: if regional stakeholders want to remain relevant in Bangladesh’s future—especially in critical sectors such as ports, energy, and high-technology manufacturing—they will need to match the pace, predictability, and financing terms that China has brought to the table.
Why Bangladesh matters now
Bangladesh sits at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal. Its economy, once mostly agrarian, has transformed into one of the region’s growth engines, powered by a vibrant garment industry, rising remittances, and aggressive infrastructure spending. As Bangladesh targets upper-middle-income status in the coming years, it needs ports, power, logistics, and digital infrastructure—quickly and at scale.
That imperative has invited substantial foreign participation. China, which signed onto a broad development partnership with Dhaka in the mid-2010s, has become a pivotal investor and contractor across multiple sectors. Bangladesh, for its part, has welcomed a diversified set of partners, from China and Japan to India, the Gulf, the EU, and multilateral lenders, attempting to keep its strategic options open while staying focused on growth.
What the panel highlights
The parliamentary panel’s report describes a multi-layered expansion of Chinese activity in Bangladesh:
- Infrastructure build-out: Chinese firms have executed or bid for major transport and connectivity projects, including highways, bridges, rail links, and special economic zones. The Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Tunnel under the Karnaphuli River in Chattogram—South Asia’s first underwater tunnel—has become a landmark example of Chinese engineering participation.
- Energy and power: China-linked companies have invested in power generation and transmission assets, including coal and gas-fired plants and grid upgrades. Joint ventures have helped add significant generation capacity to meet Bangladesh’s growing industrial demand.
- Port and maritime activity: While some proposed port projects have shifted, slowed, or been reconfigured over the years, Chinese contractors and suppliers remain active in upgrades and feasibility studies tied to Bangladesh’s maritime ambitions along the Bay of Bengal.
- Industrial zones and manufacturing: A handful of Chinese-backed industrial parks and economic zones have been launched or proposed to attract export-oriented manufacturers, especially in electronics, light engineering, and ancillary textile services.
- Defense cooperation: China has long been a supplier of military platforms and equipment to Bangladesh, ranging from naval assets to armored vehicles and aviation spares. The report notes enduring defense ties, though it stops short of suggesting any military basing or permanent presence.
Across these sectors, the panel homed in on the speed and scale at which projects have been pursued. It also flagged the policy tools China uses to cement commercial and political goodwill, including tariff concessions on Bangladeshi exports and supportive financing structures for large projects.
The Belt and Road backdrop
Much of China’s engagement in Bangladesh sits under the broader umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at boosting connectivity, trade, and supply chains across Eurasia and beyond. Bangladesh signed on to cooperate under this framework, betting that Chinese capital and engineering would accelerate the buildout it needs to sustain growth and reach its development milestones.
The results have been uneven but undeniably visible. While some projects have become signature successes, others have faced delays, renegotiations, or environmental and social concerns. The panel’s report acknowledges this mixed picture but notes that, on balance, China’s presence is firmly embedded in Bangladesh’s growth story.
Projects that define China’s footprint in Bangladesh
Without cataloging every initiative, the report and regional observers frequently point to a few emblematic areas of engagement:
- Major transport links: Chinese firms have constructed key bridges and roads, and participated in urban transport upgrades. Even when Bangladesh self-financed marquee infrastructure, Chinese contractors often played core roles in design and execution.
- Power generation: Partnerships with Chinese companies have helped add thousands of megawatts to the grid. Joint ventures have been instrumental in coal-fired capacity, while proposals for renewables and transmission upgrades reflect a broader shift in Bangladesh’s power sector planning.
- Karnaphuli tunnel: The under-river tunnel in Chattogram stands out as a technically complex project completed with Chinese participation, promising to ease traffic, improve logistics, and expand the city’s industrial footprint.
- Industrial zones: Chinese-backed economic zones aim to attract manufacturers that can plug into global value chains from Bangladeshi soil, leveraging the country’s labor force and export incentives.
- Hydro-technical development: Proposals around river management—notably the Teesta basin—aim to address flooding, erosion, irrigation, and land reclamation challenges. These projects are sensitive due to transboundary water politics and require careful regional coordination.
Trade, investment, and the balance sheet
Bangladesh’s commercial relationship with China has expanded rapidly. China is a top supplier of machinery, intermediates, and inputs to Bangladesh’s manufacturing base, while Dhaka seeks to boost its own exports into the Chinese market. The report highlights the persistent trade imbalance in China’s favor but also notes that duty-free access on a broad basket of Bangladeshi goods has helped nudge exports upward.
On financing, the panel urges closer tracking of debt sustainability and contingent liabilities tied to large projects. Bangladesh has historically managed its external obligations conservatively, and the report cautions against alarmism. Yet it argues for greater transparency on terms, careful selection of projects with strong economic returns, and diversification of funding sources—from Japan and India to Gulf funds and multilaterals—to maintain negotiating leverage.
Security and strategic implications
Even as most Chinese activity in Bangladesh is commercial, the sheer volume of projects creates strategic effects. The panel frames this as a classic “dual-use” dilemma: ports, digital networks, and logistics hubs that serve commerce can, under certain circumstances, carry strategic utilities. The report does not claim the presence of any permanent Chinese military facilities in Bangladesh, nor does it suggest Dhaka is pivoting away from its balanced foreign policy. Instead, it urges a clear-eyed understanding of how commercial entanglements can shape long-term orientation, standards, and dependencies.
Regional navies already interact frequently in the Bay of Bengal, and Bangladesh’s maritime modernization continues with inputs from multiple partners. The panel supports deeper maritime domain awareness cooperation, joint training, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercises with Bangladesh, prioritizing practical, capacity-building initiatives that deliver immediate benefits.
Bangladesh’s balancing act
Bangladesh has consistently articulated a non-aligned, interest-based approach to foreign partnerships. It engages China for infrastructure and industry, collaborates with Japan on flagship connectivity and port modernization, and works closely with India on cross-border trade, electricity exchanges, inland waterways, and transit links. In multilateral arenas, Dhaka leans into economic diplomacy while avoiding rigid geopolitical camps.
The parliamentary panel recognizes—and respects—this balancing act. Its argument is that the best response to China’s deepening role is not to demand Bangladesh choose, but to ensure Bangladesh has strong alternative options. That requires:
- Speeding up delivery of ongoing projects to avoid delays that erode goodwill and escalate costs.
- Expanding cross-border infrastructure—rail, road, and riverine links—that reduce logistics costs for Bangladeshi exporters and shorten supply chains to regional markets.
- Enhancing energy interconnection through power trading, grid synchronization, and cleaner generation projects that lower tariffs and boost reliability.
- Offering competitive financing with transparent terms, leveraging multilateral co-financing to de-risk large builds.
- Scaling people-to-people ties—scholarships, medical cooperation, skills training, and cultural programs—that build lasting constituencies for partnership.
Political timing and economic headwinds
The report lands as Bangladesh navigates post-pandemic adjustments, foreign exchange pressures, and a complex global trading environment. As garment demand cycles soften and energy prices fluctuate, Dhaka faces short-term stresses even as its long-term fundamentals remain strong. In such periods, external financing packages can appear especially attractive—another reason the panel emphasizes timely project delivery and patient capital from a range of partners.
Domestically, Bangladesh continues to invest in human capital, export diversification, and logistics modernization. It is also negotiating the policy steps needed for a smooth graduation from least developed country (LDC) status, which will alter tariff preferences and demand new competitiveness strategies.
Recommendations from the panel
While couched diplomatically, the report sketches an action plan designed to keep the regional balance healthy and Bangladesh’s choices open:
- Prioritize economic outcomes over optics: Focus on projects that tangibly lower logistics costs, reduce power tariffs, and unlock factory floor productivity.
- Create fast-track mechanisms: Cut red tape on cross-border projects and maintain high-level monitoring to resolve bottlenecks early.
- Diversify financing: Blend public, multilateral, and private capital so that no single creditor dominates large project portfolios.
- Advance standards and safeguards: Promote transparent procurement, robust environmental and social impact assessments, and strong maintenance regimes.
- Boost regional platforms: Use subregional groupings and corridor initiatives to align customs, standards, and trade facilitation measures that benefit Bangladesh’s exporters.
- Invest in soft connectivity: Support digital trade, cross-border payments solutions, and fintech collaborations that smooth commerce for small and medium enterprises.
A note on water, climate, and resilience
Beyond ports and power plants, the panel gives notable space to water management and climate resilience. Bangladesh’s vulnerability to flooding, cyclones, and riverbank erosion makes hydro-technical projects particularly sensitive—and strategically significant. Proposed river management schemes, whether led by Chinese firms or others, can transform local economies, reshape land use, and affect downstream communities.
The report urges rigorous technical due diligence, community consultation, and transboundary dialogue on water projects. It also advocates that climate finance and green bonds be mobilized to support resilient infrastructure and nature-based solutions that complement hard engineering.
What to watch next
Observers will be watching a few key developments in the coming months and years:
- Project pipelines: Which proposed transport, energy, and industrial projects move to financial close—and on what terms.
- Export momentum: Whether duty concessions and new logistics links help Bangladesh diversify exports beyond garments.
- Debt metrics: How Bangladesh manages its external obligations and refinances as global rates evolve.
- Defense procurement: The balance of suppliers and training partnerships as the armed forces modernize.
- Water diplomacy: How hydro-technical projects proceed in tandem with regional water-sharing conversations.
Conclusion: Competition that benefits Bangladesh
The parliamentary panel’s report does not call for containment or confrontation. Its thesis is more grounded: China’s increasing footprint in Bangladesh is real, multifaceted, and largely driven by Dhaka’s development needs. The best response is competitive statecraft—delivering high-quality infrastructure, reliable financing, and long-horizon partnerships that respect Bangladesh’s agency and priorities.
Bangladesh, for its part, will keep balancing. It has every incentive to welcome multiple partners, press for the best deals, and insist on projects that create jobs, boost resilience, and raise long-term productivity. If regional players step up on those terms, Bangladesh’s rise can be a story of positive-sum competition—one where infrastructure connects rather than divides, trade expands rather than fragments, and the Bay of Bengal becomes a hub for sustainable growth rather than a theater of zero-sum rivalry.
